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This paper presents a theory model that simultaneously accounts for the financing decisions 
and ownership structure in affiliates of multinational firms. We find that affiliates of 
multinationals have higher internal and overall debt ratios and lower rental rates of physical 
capital than comparable domestic firms. We also show that affiliates with minority owners 
have less debt than wholly owned affiliates and a less tax-efficient financing structure. The 
latter is due to an externality whereby minority ownership dampens the incentive to avoid 
taxes through the use of internal debt. 
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It is well known that multinationals can use internal debt to save tax pay-
ments and thus to increase pro¯ts by utilizing di®erences in national tax
rates. Such tax engineering through a strategy of borrowing and lending
among corporate a±liates has led multinationals to set up a±liates in low-
tax countries that function as ¯nancial centers. The mechanism at play under
debt shifting is that interest income is deducted in high-tax countries and
earned in low-tax countries so that the tax savings arising from the deduc-
tions in high-tax countries exceed the corresponding tax payments in low-tax
countries.1
Previous literature has studied debt shifting when a±liates of multina-
tionals are wholly owned (e.g., Mintz, 2004; Mintz and Smart, 2004). Multi-
nationals, however, often have the option to own 100%, the majority, or to be
in a minority position in (newly created) foreign entities. Empirical evidence
shows that all three combinations of ownership structures are selected, and
there is therefore a need for a theory that can explain how di®erent ownership
structures a®ect tax-e±cient ¯nancing structures in multinationals.2
This paper presents a theory model that simultaneously accounts for
the ¯nancing decisions and ownership structure in a±liates of multinational
¯rms. The theory considers a multinational ¯rm that invests abroad, and
that decides on what the tax-e±cient ¯nancing structure of each a±liate
should be, and whether an a±liate should have partial ownership. In its
decision making over whether or not to share equity, the multinational en-
terprise balances costs and gains from sharing equity.
Our model suggests that a±liates of multinationals with minority owners
use less internal debt and, thus, have a less tax-e±cient ¯nancing structure
than do a±liates of multinationals that are wholly owned. The reason is
1See Mintz and Weichenrieder (2009) for a survey.
2For evidence on ownership structure in the U.S. see Desai et al. (2004b), and for
German multinationals see Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005).
2that there is a classical free riding externality related to minority ownership
and the use of internal debt. Minority owners bene¯t in full from tax plan-
ning strategies involving internal debt, but they do not fully share the related
costs. This is so because the tax savings in borrowing a±liates bene¯t minor-
ity owners in proportion to their equity share. However, the corresponding
lending transactions give rise to interest revenues and tax payments in the
multinational's ¯nancial center where minority owners who bene¯t from the
tax deductions do not hold equity. It is this asymmetric sharing of costs and
bene¯ts, which arises endogenously in our model, that leads to the external-
ity.
In a second step of the analysis we show that since a±liates with minority
owners have a less tax-e±cient ¯nancing structure, the rental rate of capital
is higher in such a±liates. All else equal, this makes it less attractive to share
equity. This insight provides an additional explanation for empirical ¯ndings
suggesting that there is an increased appetite for control by multinational
parents (Desai et al., 2004b). Finally, we show that an optimal ¯nancing
structure (independently of ownership shares) implies that a±liates of multi-
nationals have higher internal and overall debt ratios as well as lower rental
rates of physical capital than comparable domestic ¯rms. Furthermore, they
have a more capital-intensive production structure.
Our ¯nding that debt tax planning activities of multinationals are damp-
ened by minority ownership should be contrasted to the ¯ndings in the liter-
ature on tax evasion and transfer pricing under minority ownership. In this
literature it has been shown that minority ownership gives the headquarter
of a multinational ¯rm incentives to shift pro¯t income away from minority
owners (Kant, 1988, 1990; Bertrand et al., 2002). Thus, minority ownership
bolsters tax evasion by transfer pricing.3 Our result shows that there are
qualitative di®erences between transfer pricing (tax evasion) and debt struc-
3Manipulation of transfer prices for the purpose of shifting pro¯t income is according
to most OECD countries' legislation an illegal activity (tax evasion).
3turing (tax planning). Under transfer pricing, the multinational ¯rm has
an incentive to cheat minority owners by shifting pro¯ts away from a±liates
with minority ownership. In contrast, under debt shifting, tax payments
are shifted from high-tax to low-tax a±liates favouring minority owners in
high-tax a±liates disproportionately. This is, in essence, the reason why mi-
nority ownership leads to more tax evasion under transfer pricing, but less
tax planning under debt shifting.
Our model is also related to a small but growing literature on multina-
tionals and their tax-e±cient structures. Mintz and Smart (2004) show how
multinationals may use direct ¯nancial techniques, such as lending among
a±liates, to reduce tax payments. They test their model on Canadian data
¯nding support for the hypothesis that this type of income shifting has pro-
nounced e®ects on provincial tax bases. Mintz (2004) investigates how a
multinational parent can use conduit companies to create a chain of compa-
nies for the purpose of shifting funds and claiming deduction of interest at
least twice.4 Finally, Weichenrieder (2009) studies pro¯t shifting using a the-
oretical model with minority ownership. His model is focused on traditional
transfer pricing and FDI rather than on tax-e±cient ¯nancing structures.
Using German data on inbound and outbound FDI, he ¯nds a strong em-
pirical correlation between the home country tax rate of the parent and the
net pro¯tability of its German a±liate that is consistent with pro¯t shifting
behavior.
There is also an empirical literature on tax-e±cient ¯nancing structures
and minority ownership that con¯rms the results derived in our model. A
discussion of this literature is deferred to Section 5. Below, Section 2 outlines
the basic model, Section 3 analyzes the optimal tax avoidance strategies of a
multinational that uses debt to reduce tax payments. In Section 4 we derive
optimal ownership shares, whilst Section 5 discusses and relates our results
4See also Mintz and Weichenrieder (2009) for a more elaborate model of holding com-
panies and ownership chains. Less related but in the same vein are Fuest and Hemmelgarn
(2005) who study pro¯t shifting through thin capitalization in a setting of tax competition.
4to existing empirical studies. In Section 6 we o®er some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider a multinational ¯rm (henceforth MNC) with a headquarter (hence-
forth HQ), which can invest in n countries. When investing the HQ must
decide whether or not to let some or all of its a±liates share equity. In
general, partial ownership may be exogenously or endogenously determined.
An example of the former is legal requirements where a country requires a
certain local ownership stake as is the case in China.5 Endogenous minority
ownership depends on the costs and bene¯ts of cooperation between a local
¯rm and the MNC (see, e.g., Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Mugele and Schnitzer,
2008). The gains from forming a joint venture may be related to the fact
that local ¯rms have more experience in their local markets (familiarity with
local customs, network connections etc.), whilst MNCs may have an edge
in terms of industry-speci¯c skills developed in their worldwide operations.
As a whole, bene¯ts from minority ownership may be in the form of a cost
saving and/or as a rise in productivity or sales relative to a wholly owned
operation.
We shall assume that the basis for cooperation is cost savings, but we show
in Appendix A.2 that allowing the bene¯ts of cooperation to be productivity
enhancing does not a®ect our results qualitatively. We model cost savings
by assuming that there are market entry costs CM
i in market i that are















In each a±liate the MNC employs Ki units of capital and Li units of
labor in order to produce F(Ki;Li) units of an homogenous output good
5See Kant (1995) for a discussion of exogenous ownership requirements.
5whose price is normalized to one. The production function F(Ki;Li) exhibits
positive and decreasing returns to each input, i.e., Fa > 0 and Faa < 0 for
a 2 fKi;Lig. Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile and the rental cost
of capital per unit is r > 0 and is assumed to be ¯xed (i.e., the usual small
country assumption).
The ¯rm ¯nances its investments in country i by equity (and retained











, where internal debt is obtained by borrowing from related
a±liates. We de¯ne Ki as the total capital employed by a±liate i; and let
®i = DE
i =Ki be the external debt to capital ratio, and ¾i = DI
i=Ki the
internal debt to capital ratio. The overall leverage ratio of the ¯rm can be






=Ki: Within the MNC it must be the
case that the sum of interest payments on internal borrowing and lending is








r ¢ ¾i ¢ Ki = 0
We follow most of the literature on debt structure by assuming that there
are costs per unit capital associated with borrowing that are given by the
function C = C(®i;¾i):6 For internal debt, these costs may be due to the
use of lawyers and accountants in order to avoid that such transactions are
restricted by thin capitalization or controlled foreign company rules (often
referred to as CFC rules).7 For external debt these costs may pertain to
informational asymmetries between investors and managers of the ¯rm. As
is common in the literature, we assume that there is an optimal leverage
6See for example Mintz and Smart (2004) and Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2005).
7Thin capitalization rules are in place in many countries. For a recent survey on US
rules see Hau°er and Runkel (2008); and Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008) on the
German tax code. Gouthiµ ere (2005) and Dourado and de la Feria (2008) describe thin
capitalization rules for most OECD and EU countries. CFC rules are in place, e.g., in the
US and Germany and they deny tax-exemption of passive income in the home country of
the MNC, provided that tax avoidance is suspected (see Ruf and Weichenrieder, 2009).
6ratio ¹ ®i for external debt in the absence of taxes (see, e.g., Fuest and Hem-
melgarn, 2005, and Huizinga et al., 2008). The reason is that external debt
is useful in order to discipline local managers from lax management and
\empire-building" strategies. However, if the leverage ratio goes up, the risk
of bankruptcy increases and may cause bankruptcy costs or induce the local
managers to become too risk-averse.8 Increasing external debt from a lever-
age ratio ®i < ¹ ®i will then decrease leverage costs, whereas any increase for
®i ¸ ¹ ®i will cause positive marginal costs of (external) leverage.
It follows from the discussion above that the costs and bene¯ts of internal
and external debt are very di®erent. Internal debt should rather be seen as
tax-favored equity, as it neither a®ects the risk of bankruptcy, nor reduces
any informational asymmetry, or ties the hands of managers.9 In line with
this reasoning we assume that the cost function is additively separable, that
is C(®i;¾i) = C®(®i)+C¾(¾i), as long as external credit markets are perfect.
This assumption implies that internal and external debt are separable across
countries and a±liates. This is a reasonable assumption, since managers are
not identical and monitoring capabilities may di®er across ¯rms and coun-
tries. It is also the case that thin capitalization rules and CFC regulation
may vary in di®erent countries.
We also assume that the cost function is convex in ® and in ¾. The con-
vexity related to internal debt (¾) is due to the fact that additional e®ort
needs to be made in order to conceal the true nature of the transaction from
the tax authorities, whilst the convexity for external debt (®) may be asso-
ciated with a higher premium due to informational asymmetries. Formally,
the properties applied to the cost function can be summarized as
Assumption 1 External credit markets are assumed to be perfect. The cost
8Note that external debt costs can also be a®ected by an increase in the interest rate,
which is driven by an increasing leverage ratio. We omit this in our analysis, but it can
be shown that taking such e®ects into account does not a®ect our main results.
9In line with this Chowdhry and Coval (1998) p. 87f, and Stonehill and Stitzel (1969)
also argue that internal debt should be seen as tax-favored equity.
7function related to borrowing external and internal debt in a±liate i is addi-
tively separable, C(®i;¾i) = C®(®i) + C¾(¾i), and exhibits
C®(®i) > 0 with C
0
®(®i) > 0; C
00
®(®i) > 0; if ®i ¸ ¹ ®i
C
0
®(®i) < 0; C
00
®(®i) > 0; if ®i < ¹ ®i
C¾(¾i) > 0 with C
0
¾(¾i) > 0; C
00
¾(¾i) > 0; if ¾i > 0
C¾(¾i) = 0 with C
0
¾(¾i) = 0; if ¾i · 0:
It follows from Assumption 1 that if an a±liate lends money to a related
a±liate, there are no costs associated with lending.
3 Optimal Investments
The HQ of the MNC maximizes the net after-tax global pro¯ts of the a±liates
it controls. For the MNC to structure its production and funding decisions
optimally, the HQ must control the a±liates whose pro¯t it maximizes. This
amounts to assuming that if a±liate i is a joint venture, the sum of minority
shares in a±liate i; that is Ji; is less than ¯fty percent (Ji < 50%8 i), see
Kant (1990). The ownership share in each a±liate is still endogenously given
by the costs and gains from having minority owners, but subject to the











where ¼i is economic pro¯t in subsidiary i; ¼t
i is taxable pro¯t, and ti is the
corporate tax rate in country i: A number of countries as well as the European
Union use the tax-exemption principle whereby repatriated dividends to a
parent ¯rm are exempted from home taxation. We shall assume that the
8tax-exemption principle applies in our model as well.10
The pro¯t maximization problem above relies on linear pro¯t sharing
rules. An alternative to minority ownership would be to use contractual
channels for transferring the capabilities of each ¯rm. Both the MNC and
the local ¯rm contribute capabilities to the cooperative joint venture and
we shall assume that it is more costly to transfer these capabilities through
contracts than through shared equity.11 One reason for this may be that it is
impossible to write contracts that cover all contingencies that the cooperation
need to take into account (see Gomes-Casseres, 1989).
True economic pro¯t is given by revenue from the sale of an output good
minus labor costs, user costs of capital and market entry costs,
¼i = F(Ki;Li) ¡ wi ¢ Li ¡ [r + C®(®i) + C¾(¾i)] ¢ Ki ¡ C
M
i (Ji);
where wi is the wage rate, r is the world market interest rate, and Li is
labor employed. Without any consequences for our results, we shall assume
that the user costs of debt are fully tax deductible in each country. Thus,
taxable pro¯t di®ers from true economic pro¯t in that only labor expenses,
borrowing costs and market entry costs are tax deductible,
¼
t








¡ [C®(®i) + C¾(¾i)] ¢ Ki ¡ C
M
i (Ji):
In de¯ning taxable pro¯t we assume that costs per unit of capital asso-
ciated with both external and internal borrowing are tax deductible. Such
costs may in part be associated with informational asymmetries between in-
vestors and managers or with acts in violation of the tax code, and it could be
argued that such costs should not be tax deductible. However, it is straight-
10The use of the exemption principle implies that we do not need to consider where the
HQ is located. The tax exemption principle is given by the Parent-Subsidiary Directive in
the European Union. Altshuler and Grubert (2003) study the e®ects of repatriation taxes
and the strategies used to avoid them using US data.
11There is a large literature that discusses when contractual channels are likely to be
costlier. This literature is surveyed in Lax and Sebenius (1986).
9forward to show by examination of the equations to follow that the inclusion
of these costs as tax deductible does not a®ect our results. Rearranging the
expression for taxable pro¯t we obtain
¼
t
i = F(Ki;Li) ¡ wi ¢ Li ¡ [r ¢ (®i + ¾i) + C®(®i) + C¾(¾i)] ¢ Ki ¡ C
M
i (Ji);
where capital invested in country i is ¯nanced either by debt Di = DI
i +DE
i






In line with most countries' tax code we shall assume that the user costs
of equity Ei are not tax deductible. In the next subsections the objective
is to characterize the optimal ¯nancial structure and production decision of
the MNC. Our focal point, however, will be on how the MNC can legally
save tax payments through tax planning and the use of an internal banking
system. We start by considering the pro¯t maximizing ¯nancial structure
and then proceed by examining optimal supply of the ¯nal good.
The HQ maximizes the value of the MNC after corporate taxes, neglecting
any e®ect that personal taxes may have. This is in line with most of the
literature on MNCs and is reasonable since MNCs are either owned by several
institutional investors or by shareholders located in di®erent countries.12
12It can be shown that from the viewpoint of a shareholder in a MNC, maximizing
pro¯ts of the MNC after global corporate taxation and maximizing the net pay-o® on
equity investment after opportunity costs and personal (income) taxes, yield identical
results under mild assumptions. For example, if corporate taxes cannot be deducted
against personal income tax and if the personal tax rate on dividends and interest income
is the same, it is straightforward to show that maximizing the value of the ¯rm to the
owner and maximizing corporate pro¯ts coincide. These restrictions are ful¯lled for a
wide range of real world tax codes: the classical corporate taxation system (e.g., in the
US), the new German system started in 2009 (\Abgeltungssteuer"), where interest income,
dividends and capital gains are taxed at 25% and deductions for corporate taxes are not
possible, and the Norwegian shareholder tax, introduced in 2006.
103.1 Pro¯t maximizing ¯nancial structure
The maximization procedure of the ¯rm can be seen as a two-tier process
whereby the ¯nancial structure is ¯rst optimized and then the ¯rm determines
how much of the ¯nal good to produce in each country. Thus, taking real
investment Ki (as well as labor demand Li and minority ownership share Ji)
as ¯xed initially the ¯rm's optimal ¯nancial structure is found by maximizing
equation (1). Inserting for ¼i and ¼t
i and collecting terms, the maximization





(1 ¡ Ji) ¢
©
(1 ¡ ti) ¢
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r ¢ ¾i ¢ Ki = 0
It is seen from equation (2) that minority ownership in country i reduces
the MNC's pro¯t in country i and thus global after-tax pro¯t as well. It
does not, however, a®ect the constraint that all interest payments between
a±liates must sum up to zero.















(1 ¡ Ji)(1 ¡ ti)
¶
=
[(1 ¡ Ji) ti ¡ ¸] ¢ r
(1 ¡ Ji)(1 ¡ ti)
¸ 0; 8i:(4)
These ¯rst order conditions state that the ¯rm will use both types of
debt until the marginal costs associated with each type of debt are equal
to the respective marginal tax savings. The e®ect of taxation is to reduce
the cost of external borrowing as is evident from equation (3). Due to the
tax shield o®ered by external debt, all a±liates have a tax-induced optimal
leverage ratio of ®¤, which is higher than the optimal external debt ratio in
11the absence of taxation de¯ned as ¹ ® (so ®¤ > ¹ ®):
The Lagrangian multiplier ¸ in equation (4) is the shadow price of shifted
interest expenses on internal debt. It can be shown to be equal to the e®ective
tax rate, te ´ (1¡J)¢t, facing the MNC in the lowest tax country (see Lemma
1). In the continuation we shall refer to this country as country 1. It now
follows that:







[(1 ¡ Ji) ¢ ti] = (1 ¡ J1)t1;
and the a±liate in country 1 will be the ¯nancial center.
Proof. See Appendix A.1
The a±liate (¯nancial center) in country 1 has the lowest e®ective tax rate
making it the most attractive place to channel interest income.13 The MNC




i6=1 ¾i ¢ Ki > 0, which
the ¯nancial center uses for its lending operations to the other a±liates.
The implication is that the MNC reduces its equity in all a±liates i > 1,
and concentrates its equity EI
1 in the ¯nancial center. The advantage for
the MNC in structuring its ¯nances like this is that the global tax burden
falls, since the tax savings from interest deductions in the high-tax countries
exceed the tax payments in country 1 generated by the lending activities of
the ¯nancial center.
It should be pointed out that the lending activities in the ¯nancial center
in country 1 are loss-making. The reason for this is that the user costs of
equity are not tax deductible so that lending transactions yield an economic
loss due to incomplete tax deductibility.14 The loss in the a±liate in country
13This a±liate could be interpreted as a ¯nancial center with preferential tax treatment.
However, none of our results depend on the existence of a preferential tax regime, or the
existence of a pure ¯nancial center.
14If the ¯nancial center is only undertaking banking functions, it is running an economic
121 from internal lending equals ¡EI
1 ¢ t1r; which is the opportunity cost of
equity multiplied by the tax rate.15 However, borrowing a±liates can deduct
the interest cost of internal debt against a higher tax rate than the tax rate
in country 1. For the MNC as a whole, then, the loss by the lending a±liate
in country 1 is more than o®set by tax savings in borrowing a±liates.
The ¯nancial center could have had a surplus if we had allowed the MNC
to shift pro¯t by interest rate di®erentials. We have deliberately not embed-
ded transfer pricing into the model in order to focus purely on tax planning
and leverage decisions, but it can be shown that including it in our model
would not a®ect the incentives to avoid taxes through the use of debt. Fur-
thermore, the e®ects of minority ownership on transfer pricing behavior are
well know. As shown by Kant (1988), minority ownership of foreign a±liates
gives the parent ¯rm an incentive to shift pro¯ts away from the a±liate.16
In order to see how tax policy a®ects debt structure we ¯nd by implicit












(1 ¡ Ji) ¢ (1 ¡ ti) + [(1 ¡ Ji) ¢ ti ¡ te
1]
(1 ¡ Ji) ¢ (1 ¡ ti)2 ¢ C
00
¾(¾i)










where (1 ¡ Ji) ¢ ti ¡ te
1 > 0 due to Lemma 1.
As seen from (5) and (6), an increase in the domestic tax rate ti rises
de¯cit given by ¼1 ¡t¼t
1 < 0: Based on accounting values, however, the low-tax a±liate is
running a surplus; since the return to equity is not deducted as a cost, i.e., ¼t
1 > 0.
15Omitting sales and leverage costs (C®) in the ¯nancial center for the purpose of













, where lending is re¯nanced by external debt or
equity, L1 = DE
1 + EI
1. Simplifying this expression yields ¼1 ¡ t1¼t
1 = ¡EI
1 ¢ t1r.
16Shifting pro¯ts by interest rate di®erentials is inferior to shifting pro¯ts by transfer
prices on intangibles or overhead costs, since it is easier to establish market parallel prices
on interest rates. This argument should be valid even in a complex world with advanced
¯nancial derivatives, since there are no market prices available for intangibles.
13marginal tax savings from tax-deductible debt in country i and leads the
¯rm to increase its leverage ratio of both types of debt (i.e., higher ®i and
¾i). In contrast, an increase in the e®ective tax rate of the low-tax country
(te
1) makes tax avoidance through internal debt more expensive because the
shifted interest payments now bear a higher tax burden in the tax haven.
Consequently, the use of internal debt decreases in all a±liates as shown in
equation (7).17
It follows from conditions (5) to (7) that a±liates in high-tax jurisdic-
tions have higher internal debt ratios than a±liates in low-tax jurisdictions.
Furthermore, since purely domestic ¯rms cannot engage in cross country tax
planning, their internal debt ratio should be zero. Notice that external debt
ratios are the same for all ¯rms within the same country as long as As-
sumption 1 holds. The implication is that MNCs with tax-e±cient ¯nancial
structures should have higher overall debt ratios than domestic ¯rms in the
same industry.
A central issue is how minority ownership a®ects the leverage structure
and thus the extent of tax planning. We show that minority ownership
dampens the incentive for debt shifting. The reason is that tax savings by
a±liate i > 1 bene¯t all owners equally, but minority owners in this a±liate
do not take part in paying any of the tax obligations that arise from the
funding activities of the ¯nancial center.18 Hence, the MNC bears the full
¯nancing costs, but cannot internalize the full gain. This gives rise to a
classic externality where minority ownership dampens the incentives to use
debt in a±liates with minority owners. This result and its intuition follow
17Note that the e®ective tax rate te
1 does not a®ect external debt as long as external
and internal debt are separable in the debt cost function (see Assumption 1).
18In fact as we show later the ¯nancial center will be wholly owned by the MNC. The
reason is that it is running a de¯cit so there are no gains to minority owners from holding a
stake in this a±liate. Note that if the MNC had also engaged in transfer pricing, allowing
minority owners to hold a stake in the ¯nancial center would not be optimal from the








¾(¾) ¢ (1 ¡ Ji)2 ¢ (1 ¡ ti)
< 0; i > 1: (8)
From equation (8) it is seen that the internal debt ratio falls more rapidly the
greater the minority ownership share in a±liate i (Ji increases). In contrast,
equation (7) shows that if the minority ownership rate rises in the low-tax
a±liate, tax planning by debt goes up in all borrowing a±liates. The reason
is that the loss incurred by the ¯nancial center is then to a larger extent
borne by its minority owners making it less costly for the MNC to fund tax
planning by debt.19
The result above should be contrasted to the results in the literature on
transfer pricing and pro¯t shifting. As shown by Kant (1988) and docu-
mented by among others Bertrand et al. (2002), minority ownership of a
foreign a±liate increases tax evasion by transfer pricing, since minority own-
ership provides an incentive (all else equal) to shift pro¯ts away from such
a±liates. The reason is that minority ownership acts as an additional tax
on pro¯ts, which makes it more pro¯table to shift pro¯t income away from
a±liates with minority owners.
Our result is the opposite of that under tax evasion and transfer pricing:
Tax avoidance (tax planning) diminishes with the share of minority owner-
ship. As pointed out above, tax avoidance by use of internal debt means
that tax payments rather than pro¯ts (as under transfer pricing) are shifted,
increasing tax obligations in the ¯nancial center, but reducing them in af-
¯liates with minority owners. Thus, in contrast to tax evasion by transfer
pricing where minority owners are abused, minority owners bene¯t under tax
avoidance and debt shifting.
The optimal internal debt ratio can be deduced by inverting the ¯rst
19It should be noted that minority ownership does not a®ect external debt leverage,
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1¡Ji we have ¾¤
i > 0 and Ãi(ti;te
1;Ji) > 0, where the latter stems
from C¾ being strictly convex for all ¾¤ > 0. Applying analogous arguments,












and the maximum net gain from external debt per unit capital invested
becomes
°i(ti) = ti ¢ r ¢ ®
¤
i ¡ (1 ¡ ti) ¢ C®(®
¤
i) > 0: (12)
3.2 Optimal real investment and production
Given optimal values ®¤
i and ¾¤
i, and therefore optimal net gain functions
for external and internal debt (°i and Ãi), the e®ective capital cost (~ r) after
taxation in a±liate i is given by












It is straightforward to simplify this expression to
~ ri = r ¡ °i(ti) ¡ Ãi(ti;t
e
1;Ji):
Using the optimal ¯nancial strategies and e®ective capital costs, equations
16(9) to (13) in the pro¯t function of the MNC, the maximization problem for





(1 ¡ Ji) ¢ f(1 ¡ ti)
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¡ [r ¡ °(ti) ¡ Ãi(ti;t
e
1;Ji);] ¢ Kig: (14)
The ¯rst order conditions are given by
F
i














where the two last terms on the right hand side of equation (16) are
the tax savings due to the use of external and internal debt. It is seen that
these tax savings reduce the user costs of capital. Therefore, we can conclude
that a±liates of MNCs with tax-e±cient ¯nancial structures have lower costs
of capital and thus invest more in capital than comparable domestic ¯rms
(within the same industry). Furthermore, the higher the corporate tax rate,
the larger is the subsidy from debt on the user costs of capital.
Equations (15) and (16) also enable us to derive the marginal rate of



















Equation (17) suggests that if the wage rate is the same across all ¯rms,
MNCs have a higher MRTS than domestic ¯rms because the ¯nancing costs
(denominator) are lower. As argued by Lipsey (2004), there is an extensive
literature showing that MNCs on average pay higher wages than domestic
¯rms. If this is the case, and since the ¯nancing costs in MNCs are lower
than in domestic ¯rms, the MRTS will be larger in MNCs. Empirical evidence
17from a number of countries suggests that this is the case and that accordingly
MNCs have a higher capital to employee ratio than national ¯rms.20
It is worth pointing out that the e®ects described in equations (16) and
(17) should be weaker in case of shared ownership, since internal debt is less
attractive and capital costs are higher compared to wholly owned subsidiaries
(Ji = 0) within the same industry.
4 Optimal Minority Ownership Share
As shown above, the sharing of ownership creates both costs and bene¯ts,
and in this section we analyze how these determine the optimal minority
ownership share. As an intermediate step, using equation (13) and applying






(1 ¡ Ji)2 ¢ r ¢ ¾
¤
i > 0; i > 1: (18)
Equation (18) shows that the e®ective user costs of capital ~ ri rise in
a±liate i > 1 when the minority ownership rate goes up. The reason is that
a higher minority ownership share Ji in a±liate i > 1 makes internal debt
less attractive. Consequently, internal leverage ¾i falls. This in turn increases
the user costs of capital. As will become clear later, this has implications for
the ownership structure.
We can de¯ne the elasticity of the e®ective interest rate with respect to






> 0; i > 1: (19)
20For a survey of empirical evidence related to capital to labor ratios and factor markets
see Navaretti and Venables (2004, ch. 7).






¢ r ¢ ¾
¤
i < 0; i > 1: (20)
Equation (20) shows that if the ¯nancial center had minority owners and
their share of ownership increased, this would lead to higher leverage ratios
in a±liates i > 1: The reason is that a larger part of the costs arising in the
¯nancial center would then be borne by its minority owners making the use
of of internal debt cheaper. Consequently, the e®ective interest costs ~ ri;for
a±liates i > 1 fall.
The results in (20) do not hold for the ¯nancial center. For i = 1, the




From equation (21) we see that the costs of capital in the ¯nancial cen-
ter are independent of internal leverage, since the ¯nancial center's lending
activities give rise to tax payments instead of tax reductions.
The optimal minority ownership shares now follow from maximizing after-
tax pro¯ts, given optimal labor and capital demand, L¤
i and K¤
i , and a tax-
e±cient ¯nancing structure as summarized by ~ ri in equation (13). The max-


















¡~ ri(Ji;J1) ¢ K
¤
i g: (22)
Starting with the ¯rst order condition for minority ownership share in the


















i ¡ (1 ¡ J1)
@CM
1
@J1 | {z }
(¡)
¸ 0: (23)
In equation (23), the second and third terms are positive and display the
marginal bene¯ts of having a higher minority ownership share. The second
term is the marginal bene¯t from a reduction in the e®ective costs of capital
in all a±liates but the ¯nancial center, while the third term is the marginal
reduction in market entry costs of the ¯nancial center. The ¯rst term is the
cost of sharing after-tax pro¯t with minority owners. If the ¯nancial center
is running a de¯cit, equation (23) is strictly positive meaning that the MNC
would like to have a minority ownership share that is as high as possible.
However, since the ¯nancial center is running an economic de¯cit (see the
discussion after Lemma 1), taking a positive equity stake in the ¯nancial
center is not pro¯table for minority owners. In general, the lending activities
of the ¯nancial center will make it less pro¯table compared to other ¯rms
in country 1 that do not engage in such lending operations, discouraging
potential minority owners to take an equity position in the ¯nancial center.
For all a±liates, except for the ¯nancial center (i.e., a±liates i > 1),
each a±liate's optimal minority ownership share can be found from the cor-























where xi = F(K¤
i ;L¤
i) denotes optimal production.
Equation (24) balances the costs and bene¯ts of having minority owners.
The right hand side (RHS) of equation (24) is the bene¯t from having mi-
nority owners. The bene¯t arises since minority owners cause a reduction
in marginal entry costs (@CM
i =@Ji < 0): The left hand side (LHS) is the
20marginal cost from minority ownership. Minority ownership is costly since
minority shareholders receive part of the a±liate's pro¯t. This e®ect is cap-
tured by the ¯rst term on the LHS. The second cost term on the LHS is new
to the literature and is due to the fact that minority ownership increases the
e®ective costs of capital.
In order to derive the optimal ownership share we shall de¯ne the entry
cost elasticity with respect to minority ownership as "CM












xi > 0; ai = fLi;Kig.
Applying these de¯nitions as well as the interest rate elasticity (19) in equa-
tion (24), after having substituted optimal labor and capital demand from
equations (15) and (16), it follows that
xi ¡ "xiLixi ¡ C
M







i ¡ "xiKixi "~ riJi
i
:
Collecting terms, we end up with a formula for the optimal minority










xi ¡ "~ riJi ¢ "xiKi





Note that the lower bound for optimal minority ownership is Ji = 0,
even if the fraction on the RHS is negative in equation (25). As discussed
in Section 3, in order for the HQ to set up a tax-e±cient ¯nancial structure
for the MNC, it must have control of its a±liates. Consequently, minority
owners must own less than 50 percent of any a±liate (i.e., Ji < 50%). Thus,
there is also an upper bound on the optimal minority ownership share. From
equation (25) we see that the optimal minority ownership share, Ji; for i > 1,
is higher the more e®ective it is in reducing market entry costs, i.e., the larger
"CM
i Jiis. It is lower, the larger the pro¯t income in a±liate i (i.e., the larger is
the denominator) is. Optimal minority ownership also falls (all else equal),
the more it increases the e®ective user costs of capital, "~ riJi > 0, and the
21more the resulting decrease in capital employed causes production to fall
(i.e., "xiKi > 0).
5 Empirical Evidence
One of the main ¯ndings of our model is the prediction that both internal
and external debt can be used to save tax payments. There are several em-
pirical studies showing that debt, and especially internal debt, is used for tax
planning purposes. These studies show that the e®ect of tax rate di®erences
is (highly) signi¯cant, but mostly rather small. Findings consistent with this
observation are found in Desai et al. (2004a), relying on US data, Mintz and
Smart (2004), using data from Canada, Huizinga et al. (2008), exploiting
the European Amadeus data base, and BÄ uttner et al. (2009), who replicate
Desai et al. using German data.
Minority ownership and its e®ect on tax planning is investigated in several
papers. Desai et al. (2004b) analyze the determinants of partial ownership
of the foreign a±liates of U.S. multinationals and in particular the marked
decline in the use of joint ventures over a 20-year period. Their analysis is
purely empirical and suggests that there is an increased appetite for con-
trol by multinational parents. They attribute this to three di®erent types
of coordination costs. The ¯rst relates to con°icts that may arise between
minority owners and MNCs since MNCs have an incentive to shift pro¯ts
away from a±liates with minority owners. The second factor pertains to the
fact that MNCs run the risk of having their technology appropriated by local
partners. Finally, MNCs have a desire to structure production worldwide
and this desire holds the potential for con°ict with minority owners. Our
analysis shows that there is also a fourth cost element at play. There is a
¯scal externality related to minority ownership and debt shifting that makes
it more attractive for the MNC to wholly own a±liates, since wholly owned
a±liates have more tax-e±cient ¯nancing structures.
22The ¯scal externality related to debt shifting and partial ownership that
we have derived seems actually to be captured by Desai et al. (2004b). In
Table 2 (columns 3 and 4) they compare the e®ect of taxes on the reported
pro¯tability of partially owned and wholly owned a±liates. They state that
(see page 341) \the reported pro¯tability of partially owned a±liates is con-
siderably less sensitive to local tax rates than is the reported pro¯tability of
wholly owned a±liates." Their term \partially owned" includes a±liates that
are both majority- and minority-owned by the MNC. When they distinguish
between the two groups they ¯nd that the reduced tax sensitivity is most
robust for majority-owned a±liates, i.e., a±liates with minority owners in
our setting.21 Our analysis has shown that MNCs stand to gain less from tax
planning in a±liates with minority owners. This should dictate that such
a±liates are less tax sensitive than wholly owned a±liates.
The issue of minority ownership and tax avoidance strategies is dealt with
in particular by Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005), and BÄ uttner and Wamser
(2007). Both these studies use the German MiDi (Bundesbank) data base.
They show, in line with the predictions that follow from our model, that
minority ownership exerts a negative e®ect on the use of internal debt. In
particular, BÄ uttner and Wamser (2007, p. 22) ¯nd that the leverage ratio
of internal debt is ¯ve (respectively two) percentage points higher in wholly
owned (respectively partially-owned) subsidiaries compared to non-majority
owned ones.
It should be pointed out that Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) do not have
a model to back their regression results, and BÄ uttner and Wamser (2007) do
not model minority ownership. Both studies, however, explain the higher
internal debt content in wholly owned a±liates by arguing along the lines
of Desai et al. (2004b); the argument being that minority ownership exerts
a negative e®ect on the use of internal debt due to increased coordination
21In our analysis we have ruled out the case where the MNC is a minority owner in an
a±liate.
23costs in shared ownership. Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005, p. 11) also argue
that minority owners are not in favor of tax planning and pro¯t shifting.
They state: \Coordinating several owners may be di±cult if these owners
face di®erent ¯nancing and tax conditions { after all, minority sharehold-
ers of a subsidiary do not bene¯t in the same manner from world-wide tax
minimization strategies desired by the parent."
In contrast, we show that minority owners bene¯t from tax planning, but
that they do not pay the full costs associated with facilitating tax avoidance.
This creates an externality which reduces the pro¯tability of using internal
debt in these a±liates. Put di®erently, the main reason why there is less
internal debt in a±liates of MNCs with minority owners is not due to in-
creased coordination costs, but to a positive externality. The use of internal
debt implies that economic after-tax pro¯t rises for all shareholders, but since
minority owners do not contribute to paying for the subsequent rise in tax
payments by the MNC's ¯nancial coordination center, the majority owner
pays too much of the \investment cost" and does not reap the full bene¯t of
his investment.
Our results and intuition also seem to ¯t to Japanese data on tax-mo-
tivated pro¯t-shifting between a±liates in Japanese keiretsus. Gramlich et
al. (2004) study how pre-tax pro¯ts in such a±liates are a®ected, compared
to independent ¯rms, and they de¯ne a keiretsu as a (diversi¯ed) industrial
grouping sharing the same ¯nancial institutions or being organized around
the same main bank. Though not dealing with internal debt in detail, Gram-
lich et al. (2004) show that a higher leverage signi¯cantly decreases taxable
income (table 4). Moreover, pre-tax income decreases more sharply the closer
the a±liation is to a keiretsu (p. 221). They do not ¯nd support for com-
pensatory dividends between keiretsu members (table 6). The results by
Gramlich et al. (2004) are not backed by a theoretical model and are some-
times lacking explanations, e.g., they confess on page 223, that \there may
be other vehicles beyond dividends for compensating income shifting among
24the keiretsu member ¯rms."
If their dummy variable K2 for president's council members is interpreted
as proxy for decreasing minority ownership, the e®ect of closer a±liation to
the keiretsu on pre-tax income might be explained in line with our modeling of
higher internal debt due to less minority ownership. Moreover, we have shown
that compensating dividends from the lending to the borrowing a±liate are
not necessary, as the tax-savings, and therefore the return on tax-avoidance,
accrue in the borrowing a±liate. Thus, the more pro¯t-shifting in the keiretsu
that is done by internal debt, the weaker and the more insigni¯cant the results
on compensating dividends in Gramlich et al. (2004) should be expected to
be.
In our modeling, we have neglected thin capitalization rules which intro-
duce a cap on the amount of tax deductible (internal) debt. Such rules could
either be interpreted as increasing the costs of internal debt or as explicit caps
on the use of internal debt. Either type of rule would reduce the leverage
ratio of internal debt and lead to higher e®ective capital costs. Other things
being equal, this would reduce real investment. Including such rules in our
analysis would, however, not change our results qualitatively as long as the
MNC has some leeway in terms of manipulating its leverage ratio. This view
is backed by empirical results in BÄ uttner et al. (2006) and Weichenrieder
and Windischbauer (2008). They ¯nd that thin capitalization rules decrease
(intercompany) loans, but increase equity. However, they also ¯nd that these
e®ects are so small that they probably do not a®ect real investment. Their
explanation for this result is that ¯rms can fairly easily circumvent thin
capitalization rules by setting up a holding company structure. Moreover,
the relevance of strict thin capitalization rules is theoretically challenged by
the fact that weakening these rules is a dominant strategy in corporate tax
competition (see Hau°er and Runkel, 2008).
Another instrument used as an attempt to prevent pro¯t-shifting via in-
ternal debt is CFC rules. If these rules apply, income from subsidiaries is
25taxed in the home country of the MNC and the exemption principle does
not apply. Taxation under CFC rules mostly requires that there is passive
income and low taxation.22 Relying on German Bundesbank MiDi data, Ruf
and Weichenrieder (2009) ¯nd in an empirical study that German CFC rules
are e®ective in reducing passive investments (i.e., setting up ¯nancial centers)
in o®-shore tax havens (such as the Cayman Islands and Barbados). How-
ever, they do not a®ect investments in the Benelux countries, since these are
not deemed to be low-tax countries. Thus, the CFC rules do not apply in
these countries despite the fact that they in many cases have more favorable
tax rules than most low-tax countries.23 Indeed, as a result of this a lot of
MNCs have located their ¯nancial centers in the Benelux (see Mintz, 2004,
section 2, and Weichenrieder and Mintz, 2008, section 2.1).
6 Conclusions
We show that MNCs can save tax payments by setting up tax-e±cient ¯-
nancial structures and that both internal and external debt are used as
instruments for tax avoidance. A main ¯nding in our analysis is that af-
¯liates of MNCs with minority owners have less internal debt and thus less
developed tax-e±cient ¯nancial structures than MNCs' a±liates that do not
have minority ownership. The reason is that a MNC cannot reap the full
bene¯t of tax planning when the value of tax savings must be shared with
minority owners that do not contribute to funding tax planning activities.
As a consequence, a±lates with minority owners have a less e±cient ¯nan-
cial structure and higher rental costs of capital, and these costs reduce the
optimal minority ownership share in a±liates of MNCs.
Our study has not explicitly investigated ¯nancial centers and their set up.
22See Ruf and Weichenrieder (2009), section 2, on how the German tax code de¯nes
passive and active income.
23Luxembourg and the Netherlands have very similar tax rules concerning ¯nancial
centers as Belgium.
26Such centers are often located in countries where the tax base is tailor made
to internal banking, and where the tax base is narrow and often excludes
¯nancial transactions (as in the case of Belgium). Analyzing these ¯nancial
centers in detail would require another type of model. This is left for future
research.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
From C
0
¾(¾i) ¸ 0 and FOC (4) we have (1 ¡ Ji) ti ¡ ¸ ¸ 0. Assume now
that the condition holds with equality for an arbitrary a±liate j, i.e., ¸ =
(1 ¡ Jj) tj = te
j. However, this will violate FOC (4) as long as there are
a±liates having a lower e®ective tax rate te
i < te
j = ¸. Thus, the optimality
condition can only be ful¯lled if ¸ = mini te
i = mini[(1¡Ji)¢ti] = (1¡J1)t1:
Country 1 is then a low-tax country in the sense that the e®ective tax
payments for the MNC are lower in this country than in others. Thus,
te
1 = (1 ¡ J1) t1 < (1 ¡ Ji) ti = te
i 8 i 6= 1. Accordingly, the ¯nancial center
should be located in country 1 in order to minimize tax payments on shifted
interest payments.
A.2 Productivity-enhancing Partial Ownership
In this Appendix we show that our results can be reproduced if we let the
basis for partial ownership be productivity enhancing rather than letting
it reduce market entry costs (as in the main section of our paper). We
start with the same model as in Section 2 of the paper, i.e., a MNC runs i
a±liates, producing a homogenous good x by employing capital Ki and labor
Li. Capital is ¯nanced by equity Ei, external debt DE
i and internal debt DI
i,
i.e., Ki = Ei+DE
i +DI
i, and we invoke the same assumptions as in the main
text.
27Minority ownership increases production and sales by improving access of
an a±liate i to the domestic market and to the supply chain (see discussion
in section 2 of the paper). Hence, minority ownership Ji can be interpreted
as an additional production factor and the production function of good x in
a±liate i can be written as
xi(Li;Ki;Ji) = F(Li;Ki;Ji); (26)
where the marginal productivity of minority ownership is FJi > 0. Then,






> 0; ai = fLi;Ki;Jig: (27)
The tax-e±cient ¯nancial structure is not a®ected by how the gain from
partial ownership is modeled so the results derived in Subsection 3.1 in the
paper as well as the e®ective interest rate ~ ri in a±liate i are still given by
equation (13) as follows
















The pro¯t maximization problem with respect to optimal investment and







(1¡Ji)¢f(1¡ti)[F(Ki;Li) ¡ wi ¢ Li]¡~ ri¢Kigs.t. (28): (29)
The ¯rst-order-condition for optimal labor demand in a±liate i is
(1 ¡ Ji)f(1 ¡ ti)FLi ¡ (1 ¡ ti)wig = 0 (30)
and, by applying the de¯nition of the production elasticity of labor, equa-







Accordingly, optimal labor demand is increasing in optimal production xi,
in the productivity of labor ("xiLi) and it is decreasing in the wage rate wi.
Optimal real capital demand is derived from
(1 ¡ Ji)f(1 ¡ ti)FKi ¡ ~ rg = 0; (32)
which we use to derive
K
¤




Optimal capital demand is increasing in optimal production and the produc-
tivity of capital. It decreases in the e®ective costs of capital ~ ri; and, ceteris
paribus, in the tax rate ti, because not all capital costs are tax deductible.














Indeed, an a±liate of a MNC will have a higher capital intensity than a
comparable purely domestic ¯rm, if the production elasticities are the same
in both ¯rms (e.g., if the production function is Cobb-Douglas) and given
that the wage rate in a MNC does not decrease more than e®ective costs
of capital. This is in line with our discussion on page 17 in the paper and
equation (34) above amends and replaces equation (17).
Turning to optimal minority ownership, we derive as an intermediate
step the e®ect of minority ownership on e®ective capital costs ~ ri = ~ ri(Ji;J1).






(1 ¡ Ji)2 ¢ r ¢ ¾
¤
i > 0: (35)
This e®ect is identical to the entry-cost case in the paper and we de¯ne the















¢ r ¢ ¾
¤
i < 0; i > 1; (37)
As before, the internal leverage cancels out in the expression for the e®ective




Finally, the interesting ¯rst-order-condition is the one for optimal minor-
ity ownership share in a±liates i > 1, which yields, after reordering,






Ki = (1 ¡ Ji)(1 ¡ ti)FJi: (39)
























Applying the de¯nitions of the production elasticities, equation (27), as well
as the interest rate elasticity, that is equation (36), and substituting for






















"xiJi ¡ "xiKi "~ riJi
1 ¡ "xiLi ¡ "xiKi
(42)
in a±liate i > 1; where 1¡"xiLi¡"xiKi > 0 as long as the production function
has non-increasing returns to scale. The discussion and interpretations follow
the same lines as in Section 4.
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